In this paper we analyse -theoretically and empirically -how the degree of private versus public ownership of …rms a¤ects the degree of rent sharing between …rms and their workers. Using a particularly rich linked employer-employee dataset from Portugal, covering a large number of corporate ownership changes across a wide spectrum of economic sectors over more than 20 years, we …nd that rent sharing is signi…c-antly higher in …rms with a larger share of private ownership. Estimates from our most preferred empirical speci…cation suggest that an increase in the private ownership share of 10 percentage points increases (on average) the rent-sharing elasticity by 0.0002. Based on a theoretical analysis that incorporates union-…rm wage bargaining and e¢ ciency wage e¤ects within the same modelling framework, this result cannot be explained by private …rms being more pro…t oriented than public ones. However, the result is consistent with a scenario whereby privatisation leads to less job security for workers, implying stronger e¢ ciency wage e¤ects.
Introduction
Rent sharing between …rms and their workers is a widely documented feature of labour markets in many countries (e.g., Mumford and Dowrick, 1994 ). Still, the understanding of which characteristics of …rms and workers that contribute to the size and extent of such rent sharing is still not fully developed. The present paper explores the e¤ect of an hitherto rather neglected explanatory variable of rent sharing, namely corporate ownership. More precisely, we analyse -theoretically and empirically -how the degree of private versus public ownership of …rms a¤ects the level of rent sharing. 1 To our knowledge, there exists little or no documented theoretical understanding of the link between …rm ownership and rent sharing, and so far, the empirical evidence on this relationship is fairly scant and also geographically narrow, almost exclusively limited to economies from Eastern Europe. For example, Grosfeld and Nivet (1999) , Dobbeleare (2004) and Luke and Scha¤er (2000) explore this relationship in Poland, Bulgaria and Russia, respectively. Monteiro and Portela (2010) is one exception, but their analysis is con…ned to a speci…c economic industry (banking) in a Western European economy (Portugal). The evidence from these studies is consensual in suggesting that the degree of rent sharing is larger in publicly owned …rms. However, these studies all su¤er from some common drawbacks. They all use data representing only one or a subset of industries.
Data is also collected at …rm level, for relatively short time periods, and contains, at best, a very limited number of …rm attributes. 2 In addition, these studies lack a theoretical mechanism that might explain their …ndings.
By combining a theoretical model with a comprehensive empirical analysis, we are able to contribute both to the literature on rent sharing and to the quite separate literature on public versus private …rm ownership. Our empirical contributions rely on the quality and 1 The distinction we make in this paper is between privately owned and state-owned (governmentowned) …rms. Throughout the paper we use the terminology public …rms as synonymous for state-owned …rms. 2 Monteiro and Portela (forthcoming) is an exception as they use very rich data available for 18 years.
scope of our data as well as various aspects of our empirical methods and strategies.
We provide evidence from a country (Portugal) that o¤ers a particularly rich opportunity to analyse the e¤ects of …rm ownership changes. Indeed, Portugal has experienced a comprehensive corporate restructuring process, which included both privatisations and nationalisations (although more of the former) of a very large number of …rms (more than 1000 in total) in several economic sectors (including both manufacturing and services) over a long period of time. These reforms also led to a number of …rms with di¤erent ownership con…gurations (fully private, fully public or mixed ownership) within each industry. These …rms are then used as alternative comparison groups to control for industry-speci…c shocks and to disentangle ownership from industry e¤ects.
We also bene…t from a very rich matched employer-employee dataset (Quadros de Pessoal ) available for more than 20 years. These linked data allows us to build panel datasets de…ned at di¤erent units of observation, …rm and worker, as these units are assigned unique and invariant identi…ers. Therefore, we are able to control for two sources of unobserved heterogeneity (worker and …rm) and to assess directly the importance of the level of data aggregation for the magnitude of rent sharing. In the context of rent sharing, this is, to our knowledge, the …rst study that accounts for the e¤ect of the level of data aggregation. In our empirical analysis we implement a recent procedure, discussed in Guimarães and Portugal (2009) , that allows for the estimation of models with two highdimensional …xed e¤ects. As we show later, using data disaggregated at worker level and controlling for both sources of heterogeneity signi…cantly reduces the magnitude of rent sharing.
In contrast to most previous studies, when de…ning …rm ownership we do not impose any threshold value of private ownership, but rather treat it as a continuous variable representing the fraction of shares held by private shareholders. The richness of our data also allows us to compare the magnitude of rent sharing, and the respective impact of …rm ownership, across di¤erent economic sectors.
Our empirical analysis is preceded by a theoretical section where we build a model that combines union-…rm wage bargaining with e¢ ciency wage e¤ects, and allows us to de…ne a measure of the degree of rent sharing. Netter, 2001, and several references therein). Such a di¤erence in productive e¢ ciency might be explained by agency theory and contract incompleteness. 3 The two above-mentioned di¤erences between public and private …rms are also included in our theoretical analysis, where we explore two alternative hypotheses within the same modelling framework: i) private …rms are more pro…t oriented, and/or ii) private …rm ownership implies less job security for workers, leading to increased e¤ort through a stronger e¢ ciency wage e¤ect. While these two hypotheses are clearly not mutually exclusive, we show that the implications for the degree of rent sharing are quite di¤erent.
This enables us to use the empirical analysis as an implicit test of the relative importance of these two explanations.
Our main empirical result is that rent sharing is signi…cantly higher in …rms with a higher degree of private ownership. Estimates from our most preferred empirical speci…c-ation, where we simultaneously account for …rm and worker unobserved heterogeneity, suggest that an increase in the private ownership share of 10 percentage points increases (on average) the rent-sharing elasticity by 0.0002. This result is qualitatively robust to di¤erent levels of analysis -…rm or worker level. It is also robust to alternative de…nitions of ownership (based on threshold values of private ownership shares) and to the use of di¤erent control groups. Thus, using a particularly rich and extensive panel dataset, we obtain a result that runs contrary to the existing (though scant) empirical literature on this particular topic. Based on our theoretical analysis, this result cannot be explained by di¤erences in the degree of pro…t orientation and is thus not consistent with the hypothesis that the only e¤ect of privatisation is that …rms become more pro…t oriented. However, the result can be explained by stronger e¢ ciency wage e¤ects due to less job security in private …rms.
The plan for the rest of the paper is as follows. In the next section, we lay out the conceptual framework to explain how …rm ownership can a¤ect the degree of rent sharing. In Section 3, we describe the data and the institutional background, and present descriptive statistics of the sample. The empirical analysis, both at …rm and worker level, is reported in Section 4. Section 5 o¤ers some extensions and robustness results, while Section 6 concludes the paper.
A theoretical framework
Our point of departure is a right-to-manage bargaining framework where wages are subject to bargaining between a …rm and a trade union prior to the …rm's choice of employment level. In order to allow for several di¤erent e¤ects of public versus private …rm ownership, we extend the standard framework in two directions: (i) allowing …rms to deviate from pro…t-maximising behaviour, and (ii) allowing for e¢ ciency wage e¤ects.
Abstracting from non-labour inputs, we assume that the …rm's production function is given by y = L, where L denotes the level of employment and is a productivity parameter re ‡ecting worker e¤ort. We allow for e¢ ciency wage e¤ects by assuming that labour productivity is given by = + (w w) ; 2 (0; 1) ;
where w is the wage paid by the …rm and w is the workers'reservation wage level. This is a standard reduced-form e¢ ciency wage relationship, where worker e¤ort depends, partly, on the di¤erence between inside and outside options. 4 The parameter 0 measures the strength of the e¢ ciency wage e¤ect. Thus, as long as is strictly positive, the wage level a¤ects production directly through the e¢ ciency wage mechanism, implying that the …rm's output can be expressed as y (w; L) = (w) L.
Assuming that the …rm faces a downward sloping demand curve, p (y), pro…ts are given
where the revenue function is R (w; L) = p (y (w; L)) y (w; L). We allow for non-pro…t-maximising behaviour by assuming that the …rm's objective function is given by
where S ( ) is consumers'surplus and U ( ) is union utility (to be de…ned below). Thus, the parameters s and u are inverse measures of the degree of pro…t orientation. Strictly positive values of s and u are frequently used assumptions for public …rms, re ‡ecting the fact that governments'concern for re-election would lead them to take the preferences of various interest groups into consideration (see, e.g., Haskel and Szymanski, 1993; Haskel and Sanchis, 1995; Ishida and Matsushima, 2009 ).
Workers are represented by a trade union whose objective is to maximise a StoneGeary-type utility function given by
where the parameter > 0 measures how much the union values wages relative to employment. Assuming Nash bargaining with zero fallback payo¤ for both players, the wage is given by
where 2 (0; 1) represents the relative bargaining strength of the union and L (w) solves
By some manipulation of the …rst-order condition of the maximisation problem speci…ed in (5), we can express the bargained wage as follows:
where
and , and denote the marginal e¤ects of a wage increase (for a given level of employment) on, respectively, revenues per worker, consumers'surplus per worker and union utility per worker, while is the elasticity of labour demand with respect to the union wage premium (w w). 5 With the above wage formulation, the degree of rent-sharing is given by the parameter , which depends on the parameters , , s and u , as well as the endogenous variables , , and . 6;7 How is the degree of private versus public …rm ownership likely to a¤ect the degree of rent-sharing? In order to answer this question, we need to identify which of the exogenous parameters of the model that are likely to be a¤ected by changes in …rm ownership. It 5 The bargained wage in (6) is an interior solution. However, if s and u are su¢ ciently large, this solution implies negative pro…ts for the …rm. Thus, if we impose a limited liability constraint on the …rm, the solution might be one where this constraint binds. Suppose that the pro…ts of the …rm must be at least B (in the case of a public …rm, B might even be negative). If this constraint binds, the …rm will always set employment such that w =
, implying that the rent-sharing coe¢ cient is equal to one (i.e., the maximum degree of rent-sharing). For the remainder of the analysis, we disregard this possibility, which essientially implies that we assume s + u to be su¢ ciently small for an interior solution to exist. 6 If we assume away non-pro…t-maximising behaviour and e¢ ciency wage e¤ects, i.e., s = u = = 0, the wage formulation in (6) , and the corresponding rent-sharing coe¢ cient, are similar to the ones derived by Mumford and Dowrick (1994) . 7 Notice that a well-de…ned maximisation problem implies > and + s + u < 1 for w = w .
is straightforward to show that more (less) wage-oriented union preferences and higher (lower) relative union bargaining strength will increase (decrease) the degree of rent sharing. The economics literature on trade unions suggests di¤erent interpretations of the degree of wage orientation. One standard interpretation is that represents the relative power of insiders versus outsiders, where the former are more interested in pushing for higher wages than the latter (see, e.g., Sanfey, 1995) . Another interpretation, following Pemberton (1988) , is that represents the bargaining power of union members It is not easy to see how either of these standard interpretations of and should be a¤ected by …rm ownership. In fact, in the existing theoretical literature on privatisation with union-…rm bargaining, it is typically assumed that neither union preferences nor relative bargaining strength depends on …rm ownership. 8 We make the same assumption and take the wage orientation ( ) and relative bargaining strength ( ) of unions to be constant across di¤erent ownership con…gurations. Instead, we postulate two di¤erent (but not necessarily mutually exclusive) hypotheses about the e¤ects of …rm ownership changes (privatisations or nationalisations), both of which have a foundation in existing theory.
(i) Privatisation implies a change in …rm objectives towards more pro…t orientation.
A standard assumption in the economics literature on private versus public corporate ownership is that private …rms maximise pro…ts while public …rms maximise something else, usually some linear combination of pro…ts and the utility of di¤erent interest groups in the economy. In our model, this hypothesis corresponds to an inverse relationship between the degree of private ownership and the parameters s and u ; in other words, privatisation of a …rm implies a reduction in one or both of s and u .
(ii) Privatisation implies a reduction in job security for workers. With respect to labour market characteristics, an important di¤erence between public and private …rms (at least in most European countries) is that workers in public …rms are subject to speci…c employment rules which, due to more restrictive dismissal rules, allow them to enjoy a higher degree of job security (see, e.g., Friebel and Magnac, 2007; OECD, 2008) . It seems reasonable to expect that the degree of job security would in ‡uence the strength of any e¢ ciency wage e¤ect. More speci…cally, a relative improvement in inside versus outside options should have a stronger motivational e¤ect on workers (in terms of e¤ort) if the degree of job security is lower. 9 In the extreme case of 100% job security, there would be no e¢ ciency wage motive for expending e¤ort, since the inside option can be secured with certainty. 10 In our model, we would therefore expect an inverse relationship between the degree of job security and the parameter in the labour productivity function (1).
In order to analyse the e¤ects of s , u and on the degree of rent-sharing, we need to make some assumptions on the demand function p (y). In the following we qualitatively summarise the main results for two standard cases: linear and iso-elastic demand. For further technical details, including closed-form solutions for the key variables and numerical simulations based on these, we refer the interested reader to the working paper version, **** (2010).
It turns out that the bargained wage does not depend on the degree to which the …rm cares about consumers' surplus ( s ). The reason is that, while more consumeroriented preferences lead to higher labour demand, it also makes labour demand more wage-sensitive. Whether demand is linear or iso-elastic, these two e¤ects exactly cancel each other, making labour demand elasticity unchanged. An important implication of this 9 See also Goerke (1998) for a discussion of stronger e¢ ciency wage e¤ects in private …rms due to lower job security.
1 0 Although higher job security reduces the e¢ ciency wage e¤ect, there might of course still be a positive relationship between wages and e¤ort, for example due to fair wage considerations (Akerlof and Yellen, 1990) , even for the case of 100% job security. result is that s does not a¤ect the degree of rent sharing. Thus, the only way a change in pro…t orientation can a¤ect the degree of rent sharing is through the weight on union utility in the …rm's objective function.
The two remaining parameters of interest are therefore u and , implying two very di¤erent mechanisms for …rm ownership to a¤ect rent sharing. Based on numerical simulations for the two speci…c demand functions considered, it is possible to show that changes in these two parameters have opposite e¤ects on the degree of rent sharing. These effects are closely (but not perfectly) related to how the bargained wage is a¤ected. While more pro…t orientation (lower u ) leads to lower wages, the wage e¤ect of less job security (higher ) is the opposite. The implication for the degree of rent sharing is unambiguous in the case of pro…t orientation. All else equal, more pro…t-oriented …rms will engage in less rent sharing with their workers. This result is quite intuitive; if …rms care less about their workers, they are willing to share less of the generated rents.
The e¤ect of lower job security on rent sharing is not unambiguous, but most likely positive. Except for the case of linear demand and very low values of (see (1)), an increase in leads to higher rent sharing. From numerical simulations, we are also able to show that this result is driven by the fact that lower job security reinforces the positive relationship between wages and revenues per worker (technically, the relationship between and ). In other words, the stronger the rent-augmenting e¤ect of a wage increase, the more the …rm is willing to share the rents with its workers (in the form of higher wages).
This leads us to the following conclusion: If an increase in private …rm ownership leads to less rent-sharing, this is most likely explained by a shift in …rm objectives towards more pro…t orientation. However, we cannot rule out an e¢ ciency wage explanation. On the other hand, if an increase in private ownership leads to more rent-sharing, this can only be explained (within our class of possible explanations) by an e¢ ciency wage mechanism related to changes in job security.
3 Data and institutional background
Data
In the empirical analysis we rely on data from Quadros de Pessoal (QP). This is a comprehensive matched employer-employee dataset collected annually for the Portuguese economy. QP provides rich and detailed information for each …rm or worker observed. For instance, we know the number of employees, sales, precise geographic location and legal status of each …rm. The worker records contain a number of di¤erent characteristics, such as gender, education, age, labour earnings, length of working time, exact admission date in the …rm and wage bargaining regime.
For the speci…c purposes of this study, QP o¤ers several advantages that are particularly relevant. First, QP covers virtually the whole corporate sector, comprising both state-owned and privately owned …rms. It also contains detailed information about the ownership structure of each …rm. In particular, the exact ownership shares held by the state and private owners are known at each moment in time. This allows us to build a continuous variable -intensity of private ownership -in order to assess the e¤ects private versus public ownership on the degree of rent-sharing. Traditionally, related literature (on public-private wage di¤erentials and e¤ects of privatisation) has relied on a dichotomous ownership variable which obviously depends on a pre-de…ned threshold of private (public) ownership share. 11 We are also able to distinguish between domestic and foreign private shareholders.
Second, our linked data allows us to build panel datasets de…ned at di¤erent observed units. As …rms and workers are assigned unique and invariant identi…ers, it is possible to follow each unit over time and then build panel datasets at di¤erent levels. 12 Therefore, beyond the control of di¤erent sources of …xed unobserved heterogeneity (worker and …rm),
we are able to assess directly the importance of the level and the quality of data for the magnitude of rent sharing. Until now, despite the ‡urry of studies on this topic, no study has yet controlled for this speci…c dimension. industries. Initially, privatisation took place mainly in the …nancial sector (banking and insurance) but later spread to other services and manufacturing. 13 The process has not yet been concluded but the government has withdrawn its presence in most sectors, such as brewery, paper and pulp, cement, oil and highways. In some strategic sectors (telecommunications and energy) the state has retained a quali…ed stake in capital or special voting rights ('golden shares'), which allows some control of …rm management. Therefore, QP not only o¤ers a group of …rms that switch ownership over time, which is important for identi…cation of the e¤ects, but also contains a number of …rms with di¤erent ownership shares in each industry. As we document below, we use this latter group of …rms to control for industry-speci…c shocks and to disentangle ownership from industry e¤ects.
We have performed extensive checks to guarantee the accuracy of …rm and employee data. Excluding agriculture, our initial panel for the period 1986-2007 comprises 757 984
…rms. Unfortunately, our data has missing and incomplete information about ownership for, respectively, 40% and 7% of the …rms. For the 54 401 …rms with incomplete ownership information, we were able to recover correct information for 47 301 …rms after numerous consistency checks. This means that we lose only 13% of the …rms with incomplete information about ownership. 14 Due to our careful consistency checks, we believe that measurement error in the ownership variable is a negligible problem.
However, since there is missing information on a relatively large fraction of …rms from the initial panel, we may still have a problem of sample selection bias. Descriptive stat-istics for the …rms with missing ownership information suggest that, though statistically di¤erent, they represent a subgroup of the fully private …rms, the strongest indication being that the …rms with missing ownership information are mainly very small …rms. 15 On average, the …rms in this subgroup are even smaller, with a less educated and more male-dominated workforce, than the fully private …rms with ownership information intact. They also pay less and have lower level of rents per worker. We return to this issue in Section 5, where we analyse and discuss how this missing information might bias our results.
After the above-mentioned consistency checks we kept 379 033 …rms for the analysis.
Almost all these …rms (99,6%) do not experience any change in ownership structure over time. Among these, 377 364 are fully private, 287 are fully public and 121 have mixed private-public ownership. The remaining 1 261 …rms experience a change in public-private ownership shares. Due to computational limitations, we further restrict the panel by keeping a random sample of 5% of the fully private …rms.
We then merged the resulting …rm panel with worker records. 16 We include only fulltime wage earners working at least 25 hours per week, aged between 16 and 65. The resulting panel comprises information on 16 498 fully private …rms, 252 fully public …rms, 98 …rms with mixed public-private ownership and 950 …rms that change public-private ownership structure, yielding a total of 118 691 …rm-year observations which correspond to 4 621 075 worker-year observations.
Descriptive statistics
The distribution of ownership changes for the 950 …rms that change ownership structure over the period 1986-2007 is illustrated in Figure 1 , where we distinguish between total net ownership changes over the entire period and yearly ownership changes. For example, a …rm with 10% private ownership in the …rst recorded year and 80% private ownership in (14) 17 (28) Note: Each cell reports the number of …rms and its the average size in parentheses.
…rms are subject to symmetric ownership changes over time. 18 Full privatisation involves 203 …rms (around 21%) while full nationalisation includes 70 (below 8%). 19 Moreover, the number of …rms that changed from a public majority to a private majority (351) is almost three times the number of …rms that changed in the opposite direction (120).
Finally, in terms of speed of ownership changes, …rms experience on average less than 2 (1543=950 = 1:62) annual rounds on the sale of shares. Approximately 60 per cent of …rms were sold in the …rst annual round whereas only 6 per cent involved four or more annual rounds. Table 1 shows the distribution of ownership categories -…rms that change ownership over time, …rms that remain fully public, …rms that remain fully private, and …rms that 1 8 Suppose that a …rm experienced two changes in private ownership share during the recorded period; an increase of 20 percentage points followed later by a decrease of 20 percentage points. This …rm would then be recorded with a zero net change in private ownership. Nevertheless, the two ownership changes are used for identi…cation of the ownership e¤ect in our econometric analysis. 1 9 Notice that there was no nationalisation program in place during the relevant time period. However, after the restructuring that took place during privatisation reforms, some newly privatised entities were acquired by existing public …rms in the same industry.
have a constant mixed ownership -across 18 industries over the period 1986-2007, with average …rm size reported in parentheses. Importantly, as the table illustrates, the category of …rms we rely on for identi…cation -the ones that change the share of private ownership over time -is featured in all industries. Although the share of …rms that experience ownership changes is relatively small in some industries (e.g., construction; wholesale and retail trade; hotels and restaurants), this category is still well represented, in absolute terms, in most industries. Furthermore, the presence of other ownership categories within each industry allows us to disentangle ownership from industry e¤ects, such as industryspeci…c business cycles or regulatory regimes. Table 2 reports means and standard deviations of variables for the four groups of …rms de…ned according to ownership status: changing ownership, fully public, fully private and mixed ownership. Summary statistics are presented using data aggregated at …rm and worker level. The wage variable is the logarithm of hourly wage computed as the ratio between overall monthly wage paid to each employee (including the base wage, tenurerelated and other regularly paid components, but excluding overtime payment) and normal working hours (excluding overtime). 20 For measuring rents per worker, we use the logarithm of revenues per worker. Ideally, it would be preferable to use net revenue per worker net of non-labor costs (see, e.g., Mumford and Dowrick, 1994) . However, to the extent that variation in the share of non-labor costs occurs mainly across rather than within industries, the availability of multiple units (both …rms and workers) per industry, and the use of industry …xed e¤ects in the regressions, will capture most of this variation. 21 Both variables, wages and rents per worker, have been de ‡ated and are expressed in real terms (prices for 2007) using CPI and GDP de ‡ators, respectively. 2 0 Since the data is reported for a single month (October) every year, we cannot be sure that the amount of overtime worked in this particular month is representative for the whole year. Information on overtime and overtime payment are therefore not used when calculating the hourly wage. 2 1 The use of revenues per worker as a proxy for measuring rents, in similar context, has also be done by Grosfeld and Nivet (1990) , Nickell and Wadhwani (1990) , Van Reenen (1996), Carneiro and Portugal (2008), among others. Table 2 shows signi…cant variation across the four groups of …rms. Changing ownership …rms are large …rms which pay on average the highest (unconditional) hourly wage and exhibit the higher level of rents per worker, probably re ‡ecting the higher fraction of foreign shareholders. These …rms have a relatively old and experienced, though well educated, workforce. Fully public …rms, on the contrary, despite being the largest, exhibit the lowest level of rents per worker and pay on average the second largest hourly wage to the oldest and most experienced workforce in the country. This remarkably high pay level of public …rms is likely to re ‡ect considerable di¤erences with respect to collective wage bargaining.
Public employees are mainly covered by …rm-level wage agreements while the majority of employees from other …rms are covered by multi-…rm wage agreements.
In contrast to public …rms, fully private …rms are the smallest in Portugal and pay the lowest (unconditional) hourly wage to the youngest, least experienced and less educated workforce. Finally, mixed ownership …rms are in many aspects somewhere between fully private and public …rms. For instance, mixed ownership …rms are larger (smaller) and pay better (worse) than private (public) …rms to an older (younger) and more (less) experienced workforce. Nevertheless, the level of rents in mixed ownership …rms is much larger than in either public or private …rms, probably re ‡ecting the use of the most educated employees in the country. These …rms also employ the largest proportion of female workers.
Empirical analysis
We start our analysis by examining how ownership a¤ects rent sharing at …rm-level. In order to control for …rm-speci…c unobserved heterogeneity, we exploit the longitudinal nature of the data and estimate a …rm …xed-e¤ects model. More precisely we estimate the following speci…cation:
where w jt refers to the logarithm of the average hourly wage of …rm j in year t, w jt is the reservation wage (to be de…ned below) for workers in …rm j in year t, R jt measures the logarithm of revenues per worker, P jt represents the fraction of privately owned shares, y jt is a vector of …rm characteristics, j is a pure …rm unobserved …xed e¤ect, v is a pure industry e¤ect, r is a pure region e¤ect, t is a pure time e¤ect and " jt is an exogenous disturbance. Our main interest lies in the coe¢ cients , 1 and 2 : The …rst coe¢ cient measures how wages react to the reservation wage, which is in ‡uenced by outside employment opportunities. Measuring the reservation wage (outside option) is problematic as it should take into account several aspects of the labour market such as local unemployment, the level of unemployment bene…ts and the expected real wage for each worker. In absence of this information, we compute the reservation wage as the minimum of the logarithm of hourly wage de…ned at …rm level, per year, industry and county. 22;23 The coe¢ cient 1 measures the elasticity of wages with respect to revenues per worker for fully public …rms, while 2 =100 indicates how much this elasticity changes when the degree of private ownership increases by one percentage point. 24 The vector y jt includes the ownership variable P jt . In addition, it includes further controls for …rm size (log of number of employees), a dichotomous variable indicating the presence of foreign shareholders, average age of workers, average tenure of workers, share of workers with tenure less than one year, average schooling, share of females and two dummy variables that identify three di¤erent regimes of wage bargaining: …rm level, multi-…rm bargaining and other. To control for unobserved industry e¤ects, we include a full set of seventeen industry-dummies, corresponding to the economic classi…cation code de…ned at the 2-digit level. In addition, the regressions include six regional dummies de…ned at NUT2 to account for disparities in earnings across regions. Table 3 displays the results obtained when using speci…cation (8) or some simpli…ed versions of it. The …rst three columns use all …rms sampled, while columns 4 to 6 restrict our control groups to fully public, fully private and mixed ownership, respectively. For each estimate, the standard errors are clustered at …rm level to accommodate for nonindependence of …rms over time. Table 3 , the additional covariates show, in general, the expected sign and statistical signi…cance.
Firm-level analysis
In sum, our empirical analysis so far, using …rm-level data, provides a clear and unambiguous result: an increase in private ownership leads to more rent-sharing, as measured by the elasticity of wages to revenues per worker. Based on our theoretical analysis, this result cannot be explained by more pro…t-oriented objectives in …rms with larger private shareholdings. However, the result is consistent with an increased e¢ ciency wage e¤ect due to less job security in …rms with more private ownership.
Worker-level analysis
In order to account for the role of worker unobserved heterogeneity, we estimate a similar speci…cation to (8) de…ned at worker level:
where w ijt is the logarithm of hourly wage of worker i employed in …rm j in year t, w ijt is the reservation wage for the corresponding worker i: The reservation wage is de…ned as the minimum wage for similar workers in terms of education, gender, occupation, experience and who work in the same industry and year. R jt and P jt are de…ned as previously whereas the vector y jt now includes only P jt and two variables that account for …rm size (log of number of employees) and for foreign ownership e¤ects. The vector x it , de…ned at worker level, comprises the following variables: the age of the employee and its square, his tenure (continuous variable), a dummy variable indicating if tenure is less than one year, the number of schooling years and two dummy variables identifying the regime of wage bargaining of each employee: …rm-level bargaining, multi-…rm bargaining or other. i is the employee unobserved …xed e¤ect and j ; v ; r and t are de…ned as previously. Table 4 presents results from individual wage estimations when we do not control for unobserved …rm …xed e¤ects ( j = 0): Like Table 3 , the …rst three columns use all employees working in any of the four …rm categories, while columns 4 to 6 restrict our control groups to employees from fully public, fully private and mixed ownership …rms, respectively. For each estimate, the standard errors are clustered at worker level to accommodate for non-independence of workers over time. An innovative aspect of our study is that we use all workers from the same …rms used in the estimation of (8) , which allows us to compare the e¤ect of di¤erent levels of analysis -…rm or worker -on the magnitude of rent sharing. 26 An inspection of Table 4 the same (Swedish) data. This is likely caused by the fact that we are able to control for more attributes in a worker-level analysis; more speci…cally, we are able to control for unobserved time-constant worker heterogeneity. Continued on next page... 2 6 In order to strictly compare the e¤ect of the level of analysis -…rm or worker -we would like ideally to estimate wage regressions at worker level controlling only for …rm …xed e¤ects. Nevertheless, that is not feasible as the number of …rms is very large in our dataset. as high when we compare with private …rms, relative to using fully public or mixed ownership …rms as the control groups. Nevertheless, despite all divergences in magnitude, the results reported so far are all qualitatively similar, suggesting that rent-sharing increases with the degree of private ownership. Table 5 displays results when we account simultaneously for worker and …rm unobserved heterogeneity. Given the high dimension of our matched employer-employee data (around 18 000 …rms and almost one million workers), the solution to the estimation problem is not trivial. In our estimations we follow the feasible iterative procedure discussed Continued on next page... 2 7 We have also estimated the model with the more widely used spell-…xed e¤ects and the results -which are available upon request -are qualitatively equal (and quantitatively almost identical). Compared with Table 4 , controlling for unobserved heterogeneity from both sides of the labour market improves a great deal the speci…cation of the model, measured either by R 2
or Log Likelihood of the model. The results in Table 5 are thus derived from our preferred speci…cations. Columns 1 and 2 show that the inclusion of both sources of unobserved heterogeneity does not a¤ect the wage responses to the reservation wage but a¤ects the magnitude of the rent-sharing elasticity. Indeed, while the former remains similarly strong in magnitude and signi…cance, the latter, though statistically signi…cant, drops from 0:003 to 0:002. Moreover, as before, the rent-sharing elasticity remains unchanged even after the introduction of several (statistically signi…cant) controls for observable attributes from both …rm and worker. While the size of the rent-sharing elasticity is now quite low when compared to previous studies, we are not aware of any study that uses such a rich set of observable attributes and controls for both sources of unobserved heterogeneity.
Our results from the worker level analysis suggest, once more, that rent-sharing is higher in private …rms. Even though the di¤erence is substantially attenuated when we make the extension to control for two instead of one source of unobserved heterogeneity, private …rms still exhibit a level of rent sharing three times higher than publicly owned …rms (0:003 and 0:001, respectively).
Extensions and robustness checks
We have extended our empirical analysis in several di¤erent directions by considering alternative de…nitions for some key variables, using alternative estimation methods and splitting the data according to independent variables. In this section we present the results of these extensions and discuss the robustness of our main empirical results. We also discuss the potential problem of sample selection bias. Below we only summarise the main …ndings, referring the interested reader to the working paper version (****, 2010) for more details. 28 Private ownership threshold. An alternative to the continuous ownership variable used in the main analysis is to de…ne ownership as a binary variable where the …rm is classi…ed as privately (publicly) owned if the private ownership share is above (below) a certain threshold level. Re-estimating (8) using a threshold level of 50% for private ownership only con…rms our previous …ndings, with the magnitude of rent sharing being signi…cantly larger in private than in public …rms. 29 Endogeneity. Although we have a rich set of observable …rm attributes and control for …rm, worker and other unobserved …xed e¤ects, we should address the possibility that controlling for rents' endogeneity might reverse our previous …ndings. In the absence of external instruments, we have used lagged rents as instruments for current rents. By construction, these are correlated with current rents, but -assuming no serial correlation in the error term -are not correlated with the residuals in a …rm level equation. Performing a GMM …xed-e¤ects type of estimation at …rm level 30 , which provides e¢ cient estimates of the relevant coe¢ cients as well as consistent estimates of the standard errors, our main …nding from the previous analysis is, once more, qualitatively con…rmed. Rent sharing is found to be higher in public than in private …rms, although the relevant coe¢ cients are less precisely estimated. By instrumenting …rm rents we also obtain generally higher rent-sharing elasticities, which is a common …nding in the rent-sharing literature.
Weighting by …rm size. In our main analysis at …rm level we have weighted all …rms equally when estimating the e¤ect of ownership on rent sharing. However, since …rm size varies substantially across di¤erent ownership con…gurations, weighting observations by employment will increase the importance of large …rms (mainly public, with less rentsharing) and reduce the in ‡uence of small …rms (mainly private, with more rent-sharing) in the estimation. Thus, we would expect that weighting observations by …rm size will reduce the estimated level of rent sharing. This is also what we …nd when we re-estimate (8) and weight …rms by employment. Nevertheless, the e¤ect of private ownership on rent-sharing is qualitatively the same as in the main analysis.
Rents per working hour. Following the received literature, our measure of rents has been expressed in per capita terms. If …rms adjust the labour force in terms of working hours rather than number of employees, our rent measure might be biased in either direction. It turns out that controlling for working hours only reinforces our earlier …ndings. The rent e¤ect becomes clearly stronger in private than in public …rms, using either …rm-level or worker-level data.
Asymmetric e¤ects across sectors. We have also explored the possibility that our estimated e¤ects might vary across di¤erent sectors of the economy, due to institutional or other di¤erences that have not yet been accounted for in our empirical analysis.
One potentially important institutional heterogeneity is that wage bargaining takes place mainly along industry divisions in manufacturing, while in services wage bargaining along occupational divisions is more common. In order to account for such di¤erences, we have run separate regressions for manufacturing and services. It turns out that rent sharing is substantially higher in manufacturing than in services. Furthermore, it appears that the evidence of higher rent sharing in private than in public …rms depends both on the sector and level of analysis. The e¤ect of increased private ownership on rent sharing is positive in both sectors for both levels of analysis. However, at …rm level the e¤ect is statistically signi…cant only for services, while at worker level the e¤ect is signi…cant only for manufacturing.
We have also done a further decomposition by estimating the empirical model (at …rm-and worker-level) for each industry separately. Unsurprisingly, the worker-level analysis produces signi…cant e¤ects for a larger number of industries than do the …rm-level analysis.
Using worker-level data, private ownership has a signi…cantly positive e¤ect on rent sharing in 8 industries, while the corresponding number in the …rm-level analysis is 4. Although most of the signi…cant coe¢ cients are positive, there are also examples of signi…cantly negative e¤ects in some industries. The industries that exhibit a signi…cantly positive e¤ect of private ownership on rent sharing at both levels of analysis are "Food", "Nonmetallic" and "Wholesale". 31 Asymmetric e¤ects across bargaining regimes. We have also explored whether the ownership e¤ect varies according to di¤erent bargaining regimes. Re-estimating our empirical model (at …rm-and worker-level), interacting a variable identifying each of the three bargaining regimes with rents per worker and private ownership share, we …nd 3 1 The regression results decomposed at industry level are available upon requests.
that the e¤ect of ownership on rent sharing does not qualitatively depend on the wage bargaining regime. The e¤ect is also quantitatively quite similar across di¤erent bargaining regimes, although slightly larger (at both levels of analysis) for …rms which are subject to …rm-level bargaining. 32 Privatisation versus nationalisation. Given the institutionally rich Portuguese context, with both privatisations and nationalisations of …rms, it is natural to ask whether increases and reductions in private ownership lead to similar (symmetric) rent-sharing e¤ects. We have explored this question by de…ning a threshold level of private capital of 50% and classifying …rms into four di¤erent groups. Firms that cross the threshold once from below (above) during the period of analysis are classi…ed as privatised (nationalised) …rms, while …rms that remain below (above) the threshold during the entire period are classi…ed as public (private) …rms. 33 By interacting a dummy variable identifying each of the four categories of …rms with rents per worker and private ownership, we are able to test whether the e¤ect of a change in private ownership on rent sharing di¤ers between …rms that are privatised and …rms that are nationalised, and to which extent the e¤ect depends on ownership changes that cross the 50% threshold level. Re-estimating the …rm-level model, we …nd that an increase in the private ownership share has a positive and signi…cant e¤ect on rent sharing for private and privatised …rms, while the e¤ect is not signi…cant (but with a positive coe¢ cient) for nationalised and public …rms. However, by re-estimating the model using worker-level data, we …nd positive and statistically signi…cant e¤ects for all groups of …rms, with the magnitude of the e¤ect being larger for privatised and nationalised …rms than for …rms that did not cross the threshold level of private capital.
Furthermore, the magnitude of our estimated coe¢ cients show a remarkable symmetry:
the e¤ect of a marginal increase in private ownership is quantitatively the same (0:003) for …rms that are above (private) and below (public) the threshold, and it is quantitatively the same (0:009) for …rms that cross the threshold from below (privatisations) and for …rms that cross the threshold from above (nationalisations). 34 Sample selection bias. Finally, we explore the direction of possible bias due to missing information on the ownership variable. As mentioned in Section 3, the descriptive statistics strongly suggest that the …rms with missing ownership information are private …rms. We have therefore explored this potential bias by classifying the …rms with missing ownership information as being fully private and re-estimated our empirical model (at …rm-and worker level). The magnitude of the ownership e¤ect is slightly lower in the …rm-level analysis, but slightly larger in the worker-level analysis. Thus, whether excluding …rms with missing ownership information leads to an underestimation or an overestimation of the ownership e¤ect, seems to depend on the level of analysis (given that the dropped …rms are indeed private). More importantly, though, our main result is qualitatively unchanged: the degree of rent sharing is signi…cantly higher in …rms with a larger share of private ownership. 35 
Concluding Remarks
Private …rms tend to share the rents with their workers to a larger extent than their public counterparts. This (perhaps surprising) result is the main conclusion of our empirical analysis based on an extensive and rich linked employer-employee dataset, covering a large number of ownership changes in both directions (although the proportion of …rms with ownership changes is small) across a wide spectrum of economic sectors in Portugal over a long time period. Based on our most preferred empirical speci…cation, where we simultaneously account for …rm and worker unobserved heterogeneity, an increase in the private ownership share of 10 percentage points increases (on average) the rent-sharing elasticity by 0.0002.
When seen in the light of our underlying theoretical framework, the perhaps most interesting implication of this result is that it cannot be explained by the often postulated hypothesis that private …rms are more pro…t oriented than public ones. Rather, our result, when seen in conjunction with the theoretical analysis, indicates that other di¤erences are more important. Although alternative explanations cannot be ruled out, we have shown that a positive relationship between the degree of private ownership and rent sharing is consistent with stronger e¢ ciency wage e¤ects in private …rms due to less job security.
